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THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY IN 
AMERICA:
ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND SOME
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ITS FUTURE
Robert S. Driscoll*
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the California Supreme Court took what was 
a relatively
stable area of the law, that of premises liability, and 
thrust it into the
national legal debate over the nature of the tort system.' 
Whereas the
state courts had up until Rowland v. Christian
2 followed a system of
liability deeply rooted in the common law, 
California's decision sig-
naled a new direction for the ownership of land. 
The traditional sys-
tem had defined landowner duties based on 
the status of the entrant;
assigning higher duties to those there by consent 
and lower duties to
those who trespassed.3 The Rowland standard, 
however, essentially re-
moved this special protection for landowners from 
the normal rules of
negligence and imposed a standard of reasonable 
care, only consider-
ing the status of the entrant as one of many 
factors in making the
determination.4 What was once a fairly uniform 
system across the
states became fractured as some courts followed 
Rowland,5 others re-
jected it,6 and still others sought a middle ground.
7 Further, in some
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 
2007; M.P., University of
Dallas, 2004; B.A., Hillsdale College, 2003. 1 
would like to thank Professor Eric Claeys
for his guidance and advice throughout the whole 
note-writing process. I am also
grateful to the staff of the Notre Dame Law 
Review, who did an excellent job in
reviewing and editing the piece. Finally, I'd 
like to thank my wife, Kathy for all her
love, support, and patience during my time 
in law school.
1 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
2 Id.
3 See infra Part I.A.
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra note 46.
6 See infra note 63.
7 See infra note 64.
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states, the legislatures passed statutes to explicitly overturn decisions
in their courts moving to a unitary standard of reasonable care.8
The confusion and diversity among the states provides commen-
tators with an opportunity to assess the current state of the law of
premises liability and also to look back at its roots in the common law.
As courts search for reasons and justifications for or against the Row-
land standard, a reexamination of the path that got the system to
where it is today is wise. Indeed, it may be the case that Rowland rep-
resented a wrong turn and the current reaction against it could return
the legal system to a more acceptable state.
Part I of this Note will examine the system of premises liability as
defined in various state courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
as well as describe the tripartite system's erosion in the early and mid-
twentieth century and its possible revival today. Part II looks back at
the judicial roots of the tripartite system and connects it with the
founding principles of the nation. These principles, which ultimately
produced the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,
were not only pertinent at the federal level but also animated the
American system of property at the state level. Part III examines the
law of trespass, and one of its numerous exceptions, the attractive nui-
sance doctrine, in light of the roots of the tripartite system. I argue
that early twentieth-century courts moved away from the original justi-
fication behind the doctrine and this in turn has bred much of the
confusion complained of in twentieth-century opinions and scholar-
ship. Finally, Part IV argues that the common law system of trespass is
still highly relevant, even in today's society, and that courts would do
well to observe the category to protect property rights. I also argue
that the Rowland standard of unitary care represents a departure from
certain rule of law values which are vital to our legal system.
Courts should think carefully about the original justifications for
a tripartite system of liability since the practical outcomes of these
ideas are still desirable today. The system as a whole is consistent with
the fundamental principles upon which this country was founded.
Practically, the system is designed to secure to landowners the free
possession and use of their property while at the same time imposing
reasonable duties that arise out of the landowner's relationship with
the rest of society.
8 See infra notes 55-57, 62-63 and accompanying text.
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I. THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM
A. The Modern Tripartite System of Premises Liability
The common law system of premises liability defines a land-
owner's responsibility to others on his land by using a tripartite system
based upon the visitor's relationship with the landowner. These dis-
tinctions, which stretch far back into English common law, are "an
absolutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no no-man's land
between adjacent territories. When I say rigid, I mean rigid in law."9
The owner owes the highest duty of care to the invitee. There is some
disagreement in the literature about what exactly defines an invitee:
some argue that if the land has been held open to the public in such a
way as to imply an invitation, then anyone entering becomes an invi-
tee; whereas others argue that the concept of an invitee only encom-
passes business relationships. 10  This ambiguity is reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which defines an invitee as not only
one who enters the land "for a purpose for which the land is held
open to the public," but also as a "business visitor" who comes upon
the land for a purpose connected in some way with "business dealings
with the possessor of the land."" Since the invitee has been invited
onto the land by the landowner, whether implicitly or explicitly, the
landowner has a duty of "reasonable care for his safety."'12 Thus, he
must not only warn the invitee of conditions which may exist and
cause harm, but also protect him against those dangers of which the
invitee "knows or has reason to know, where it may reasonably be ex-
pected that he will fail to protect himself notwithstanding his
knowledge."' 3
A licensee, however, is a "person who is privileged to enter or
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent."' 4 To licen-
9 Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (opinion of Viscount Dunedin).
10 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1, at 130 & nn.8-9 (2d ed.
1986). In an influential article, William Prosser argued that over the years, the courts
have mistakenly moved away from the idea of an invitee as anyone who enters land
that was thrown open to the public in favor of the narrower conception of a business
visitor. He argued: "[T]he duty of the occupier toward his 'invitee' was not, in its
inception, a matter of a quid pro quo for a benefit conferred or hoped for. It rested
rather upon an implied representation of safety, a holding out of the premises as
suitable for the purpose for which the visitor came .... " William L. Prosser, Business
Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573, 585 (1942).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
12 Id. § 341A.
13 Id. § 341A cmt. a.
14 Id. § 330.
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sees, the landowner owes a duty of reasonable care 
if "he should ex-
pect that they will not discover or realize the danger" 
and "they do not
know or have reason to know of the possessor's 
activities and of the
risk involved." 15 Once the landowner has informed 
him of these dan-
gers, the licensee "has all that he is entitled to 
expect, that is, an op-
portunity for an intelligent choice as to whether 
or not the advantage
to be gained by coming on the land is sufficient 
to justify him in incur-
ring the risks involved."
16 Perhaps counter-intuitively, the licensee cat-
egory normally encompasses visitors who are there for 
social reasons,
including invited guests of the owner, and they 
thereby receive less
protection than do invitees.
17
The final category at common law is perhaps 
the best known-
that of a trespasser. The Restatement defines a 
trespasser as one "who
enters or remains upon land in the possession 
of another without a
privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent 
or otherwise." '
Though there without any right, a landowner 
may not inflict deliber-
ate harm on an innocent trespasser.
19 
"Deliberate shootings or set-
ting traps to capture such individuals create 
a near automatic
liability."20 In terms of unintentional behavior, 
the landowner owes
very little care to a trespasser. He must only act 
to avoid willful and
wanton misconduct which "falls on the scale 
of wrongdoing some-
where between the intentional infliction of harm 
and gross negli-
gence."' 21 The traditional justification for such a rule stems 
from the
trespasser's wrongdoing:
When they enter where they have no-right or privilege, 
the responsi-
bility is theirs, and they must assume the risk 
of what they may en-
counter, and are expected to look out for themselves. 
Such has
15 See id. § 341.
16 Id. § 341 cmt. a.
17 Some commentators have criticized this distinction. 
See 5IHARER ET AL., supra
note 10, § 27.11, at 215-18, which calls attention to the 
"semantic difficulty" it has
caused. Prosser justifies the distinction by comparing the social 
guest to a member of
the landowner's family: "IT]he guest understands when 
he comes that he is to be
placed on the same footing as one of the family, 
and must take the premises as the
occupier himself uses them, without any preparations 
made for his safety .... Pros-
ser, supra note 10, at 604.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 329 (1965).
19 See Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911, 
913 (C.P. 1828).
20 RICHARD A. EpsTEIN, TORTS § 12.3, at 314 (1999).
21 GLENN WEISSENBERGER ET AL., THE LAW 
OF PREMisES LIABILITY § 2.3 (3d ed.
2001).
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always been the point of view of the common law, with its traditional
regard for the rights of private ownership of property.2 2
Once this basic law of relationships between landowners and tres-
passers has been established, the rest of trespass law deals with excep-
tions to the rule entitling certain trespassers to greater duties of
care.2 3 Most of these exceptions deal with situations in which the
landowner knows or has reason to know that members of the public
constantly trespass, knows or has reason to know of a specific tres-
passer on the land, or with trespassers who are children. 24
B. The Abolition of the Tripartite System in the Twentieth Century
Despite its roots in the common law, the tripartite system of
premises liability began to erode in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury and eventually came under full-fledged attack. The distinctions
first fell in the country of their birth, when England passed the Oc-
cupiers' Liability Act of 1957.25 The statute had the effect of entirely
eliminating the distinction between an invitee and licensee from En-
glish law. 26 The American Supreme Court was quick to follow suit in
federal admiralty law. Joseph Kermarec was visiting a friend and
member of respondent's crew on board the S.S. Oregon, docked in
New York City, when he fell descending the staircase while disembark-
ing.27 While generally ship owners owed a duty of reasonable care to
any aboard a vessel who were not members of the crew, the Court in
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique2 8 took up the question
of "whether a different and lower standard of care is demanded if the
22 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 58, at
393 (5th ed., 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON] (citation omitted).
23 Id. § 58, at 395.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334-339 (1965).
25 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
26 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 n.10
(1959). The Occupiers' Liability Act states that the law affects "any invitation or per-
mission [the occupier] gives to another to enter or use the premises .. .and as his
visitors are the same ... as the persons who would at common law be treated as an
occupier and as his invitees or licensees." Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,
c. 31 § 1 (2). Thus, the Act would not apply to traditional "trespassers" as they do not
receive an invitation or permission. It was not until 1984 that the Occupiers' Liability
Act changed the common law for trespassers. The updated Act applies to any person
"other than [the occupier's] visitors" and the owner owes a duty of care if he knows or
should know of a dangerous condition, he knows or should know the trespasser is in
the vicinity of the danger, and the danger is one which the owner can help to protect
against. Occupier's Liability Act, 1984, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 3, § 1.
27 Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 626.
28 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
2006]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ship's visitor is a person to whom the label 'licensee' can be at-
tached."29 In making such a determination, the Court found that it
ought to be "free from inappropriate common-law concepts. '3" Not-
ing that the distinctions came from "a culture deeply rooted to the
land" which also "traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudal-
ism," the Court believed that the needs of a modern, urban society
were demonstrably different.31 Practically speaking, the distinctions
had "bred confusion and conflict" which the Court characterized as a
"semantic morass.132 Given the contrast between modern society and
the feudalism of medieval England as well as the practical difficulties
the Court saw in administering the categories, it held that ship owners
would owe to everyone on board "the duty of exercising reasonable
care under the circumstances of each case."33
The Supreme Court's decision not to extend the categories into
admiralty law was taken a step further by the California Supreme
Court in Rowland v. Christian.3 4 Instead of simply refusing to imple-
ment the system in a new area of law, the court completely abolished
the categories in California. Defendant Nancy Christian was a tenant
of an apartment and knew that the knob on her bathroom sink was
cracked and had informed her landlord of the condition.3 5 Plaintiff
James Rowland, her social guest, was not told of the dangerous condi-
tion in the bathroom and severely injured himself when the knob
cracked. - 6
The court began its analysis by noting that California Civil Code
Section 1714 at the time established a basic duty of reasonable care in
all situations in the state. 37 Thus, starting the analysis with the duty of
29 Id. at 630.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 631.
33 Id. at 632.
34 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
35 Id. at 562-63.
36 Id. Though this case has become famous for its abolition of the categories, it is
worth noting that even under the tripartite system Rowland likely would have recov-
ered damages. As a social guest, he was a "licensee" and thus Christian had a duty to
warn him of any dangerous conditions of which she knew. Having failed in her duty,
she would likely be held liable. SeeEPSTEIN, supra note 20, § 12.11, at 331 (noting that
"Rowland abolished the licensee/invitee distinction on facts that would have allowed
the licensee to recover under the older common law rules"). The fact that the court
uprooted the entire system here suggests that a deeper animosity to the rules had
been brewing in the legal world which caused the abolition, rather than an accidental
effect arising from a desire to do justice to a sympathetic plaintiff in an individual
case.
37 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563-64.
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reasonable care, an "exception" could only be made if "clearly sup-
ported by public policy."'38 Drawing on the logic of Kermarec, the court
noted:
It has been suggested that the special rules regarding liability of the
possessor of land are due to historical considerations stemming
from the high place which land has traditionally held in English
and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the land-
owning class in England during the formative period of the rules
governing the possessor's liability, and the heritage of feudalism.3 9
Implicit in such a statement is that any notion of property law
traceable to the feudal period has no place in modern law with its
greater regard for "human safety. '40 Any attempt to apply "ancient
terminology" to "modern society" will necessarily result in "complexity
and confusion." 41 Going further than the Occupiers' Liability Act of
1957, the court concluded that liability would depend on whether the
landowner "has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of
injury to others," while the plaintiffs status as a licensee, invitee, or
trespasser would be only one factor in the liability inquiry and no
longer controlling in any case. 42
The common theme running through the erosion and eventual
abolition of the tripartite system is the necessity for a modern society
to move past feudal vestiges in the law. The "modern consensus" is
that the "dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England
during the formative period of this development" led directly to a sys-
tem of classifications "bound up with the values of a social system that
traced much of its heritage to memories of feudalism." 43 As early as
38 Id. at 564.
39 Id. at 564-65.
40 Id. at 565; accord PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 58, at 395 ("These
[exceptions to the common law system] have developed in many states because of an
increasing feeling that human safety is generally of more importance than the defen-
dant's interest in unrestricted freedom to make use of his land as he sees fit .... ").
41 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567.
42 Id. at 568.
43 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 10, § 27.1, at 131-32. While it is beyond the
scope of this note to examine this argument in any depth, it seems odd to apply it to
America's adoption of the tripartite system. The literature commonly traces its intro-
duction in America to the case of Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R.L Co., 92 Mass. (10
Allen) 368 (1865). At that time, Massachusetts was a budding industrial area without
strong ties to the feudalism referred to by the "modern consensus." See, e.g., JAMES
MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM 95 (1988) (noting that in the area of textile
manufacturing, "It]he city of Lowell, Massachusetts, operated more spindles in 1860
than all eleven of the soon-to-be Confederate states combined"). Indeed, northern
industrial states were just ending a war against a southern agrarian economy more
2oo61
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1923, Professor Green argued that the tripartite system had settled in
before the negligence system had taken hold and thus, in essence, was
grandfathered into the law. He argued, "the controlling cases were
decided before the theory of negligence had so largely supplanted the
earlier notion of responsibility. It is wholly out of harmony with our
general theory of tort liability. If it is to be regarded as settled law, it
has become so by default."44 A less sympathetic view is offered by Pro-
fessor Henderson. He believed that the common law system was
threatened, and ultimately replaced, by "first, the mounting social
pressures favoring compensation of accident victims as an end in it-
self; and second, the growing tendency in modern legal thought to
view formality of any kind as an unnecessary impediment to achieving
justice in every case." 45
C. The Tripartite System Post-Rowland
Whatever the origins of the tripartite system, Rowland set off a
firestorm in local tort law. Immediately following the Rowland deci-
sion, a number of state courts set about totally abandoning the tripar-
tite system of premises liability. 46 The Hawaii Supreme Court
dismissed the established distinction in a perfunctory two-page opin-
ion, arguing that the "common law distinctions between classes of per-
sons have no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for
the safety of others." 47 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals sim-
ply stated that the distinctions "need no longer be made," relying on
closely related to the English feudal system and it would seem inconsistent for their
courts to begin adopting laws congenial to this economic model. Nevertheless, the
argument of this Note is that regardless of its origins, the tripartite system (and in this
case the laws applying to trespassers), is still viable for modern society and ought not
be expunged from the law.
44 Leon Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility
in Tort, 21 MICH. L. REv. 495, 511 (1923).
45 James A. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 511-12 (1976) (footnote omitted) (arguing that cases like Row-
land threaten the tort system of liability by pursing substantive aims without consider-
ing the realities and limits of any system of legal liability).
46 See Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Webb
v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732-34 (Alaska 1977); Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314-15 (Colo. 1971), superseded by statute, CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-115 (2005); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446
(Haw. 1969); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller,
352 N.E.2d 868, 871-73 (N.Y. 1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d
127, 133 (R.I. 1975), partially overruled by Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637
A,2d 1056, 1061-62 (RI. 1994).
47 Pickard, 452 P.2d at 446.
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England's abandonment as well as Rowland and Kermarec.4s Other
practical justifications include preventing "confusion and judicial
waste" as well as allowing the jury to apply "changing community stan-
dards to a landowner's duties";49 changing the "rigid common law"
which added "confusion" to the law and thus was "no longer desirable
in modern times";50 and a more general desire to "bring the common
law into accord with present day standards of wisdom and justice
rather than to continue with some outmoded and antiquated rule of
the past."51 Even as late as the mid-eighties, some influential com-
mentators claimed that "this special privilege [of judging a land-
owner's liability based on the status of the entrant] is receding; it
remains here to trace the current developments of this recession."52
However, consistent with Mark Twain's famous quip that "the re-
ports of my death are greatly exaggerated," the tripartite system has
not disappeared from state law and has instead seen some resurgence.
In fact, two of the early cases which abandoned the system completely,
Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka53 and Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,54
saw their rulings overturned at least in part by an act of the legisla-
ture.5 5 The Colorado Legislature initially attempted to do so by pass-
ing section 13-21-115 in 1986. However, the Colorado Supreme Court
struck down the provision for violating equal protection because
"[tihe effect of this classification scheme of duties is to impose on
landowners a higher standard of care with respect to a licensee than
an invitee." 56 The legislature revised the classification scheme to im-
pose "on landowners a higher standard of care with respect to an invi-
tee than a licensee, and a higher standard of care with respect to a
licensee than a trespasser. ' 57 In Rhode Island, the Supreme Court
48 Basso, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72.
49 Mile High Fence, 489 P.2d at 311-12.
50 Webb, 561 P.2d at 732.
51 Mariorenzi, 333 A.2d at 133 (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)).
52 HARPER ET AL., supra note 10, § 27.3, at 147.
53 Webb, 561 P.2d 731
54 Mile High Fence, 489 P.2d 308.
55 See Univ. of Alaska v. Shanti, 835 P.2d 1225, 1228 n.5 (Alaska 1992); Bath Exca-
vating & Constr. Co. v. Wills, 847 P.2d 1141, 1145 & n.8 (Colo. 1993).
56 Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 862 (Colo. 1989).
57 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-115 1.5(c) (2005). Though the legislature also stated
that "by amending this section [it] is not reinstating the common law status categories
as they existed immediately prior to Mile Hi [sic] Fence v. Radovich" the effect of the
hierarchy is basically the same. Id. § 13-2-115 1.5(e). The legislature could have been
acting overcautiously given the court's discussion in Gallegos that the reason the Colo-
rado legislature passed the new law was to return to a pre-Mile High Fence regime
because the burden was unfairly shifted from landowners to trespassers. See Gallegos,
2006l
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overruled Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc.
58 as it applied to trespassers.
The court held in Tantimonico v. Allendale Mutual 
Insurance Co. 5 9 that
two trespassing motorcyclists who collided while negligently 
riding
their bikes could not recover against the landowner, thus 
overturning
Mariorenzi's abandonment of all three categories.
60 The court de-
clined to comment, however, on the question of invitees 
and licen-
sees, thus implying a dichotomy between trespassers 
and invitees/
licensees. 61 Even California's legislature saw fit to scale 
back the Row-
land decision. The California Civil Code provides that 
a landowner is
not liable for the death or injury of any person on his property in the
course of or after the commission of certain enumerated 
violent
felonies. 62
These courts and legislatures are not alone in their 
full or partial
reversal of a Rowland-like unitary standard of care. 
A near majority of
states have actually rejected a unitary standard and still apply the 
tri-
partite system. 63 Further, many state courts 
have preserved the tres-
passer distinction while merging licensee and 
invitee into one
category.6 4 The Rowland trend may have stopped completely. 
At best,
the status of the law remains uncertain and the relative 
calm could
signal either a rest stop along the way, or a movement 
back towards
the tripartite system, or some version thereof. 
However, the latter
seems to be more plausible. As recently as 2002, the 
Iowa Supreme
Court noted that "[g]iven the fact that only one court 
in the last
twenty-seven years has abandoned the common law trespasser 
rule,
the so-called 'trend' to adopt a universal standard of 
care for premises
liability has clearly lost momentum.
' 65 This loss of steam could "re-
779 P.2d at 861 & n.6. This would be curious especially 
because the court also stated
that "it is unquestionably within the legislature's purview 
to enact legislation which
modifies or abrogates decisions of this court so 
long as the legislation is constitu-
tional," Id. at 861.
58 333 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1994).
59 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1994).
60 Id. at 1056-57, 1062.
61 Id. at 1062.
62 CAL. CUV. CODE § 847 (West Supp. 2006).
63 See Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1276 n.10 
(Okla. 1990); see alsoVitauts M.
Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's 
Liability Upon Status
of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R. 4th 294, 
§ 4, at 310 (1983 &
Supp. 2006) (listing cases in which the injured person's status as an 
invitee, licensee,
or trespasser was determinative).
64 E.g., Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 
(N.C. 1998) (holding that though
the court will "eliminate the distinction between 
licensees and invitees by requiring a
standard of reasonable care toward all lawful 
visitors," it "will retain a separate classifi-
cation for trespassers"); see also Gulbis, supra note 63, § 
3(b), at 307-10.
65 Alexander v. Med. Assocs. Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 
74, 78 (Iowa 2002).
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flect a more fundamental dissatisfaction with certain developments in
accident law that accelerated during the 1960s." 66 Whatever the even-
tual outcome, it appears for now that the post-Rowland experiments
have given many courts "a renewed appreciation for the considera-
tions behind the traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults"
which makes them skeptical of unilaterally 'jettison[ing] years of de-
veloped jurisprudence in favor of a beguiling legal panacea."67
II. THE JUDICIAL ROOTS OF THE TRiPARTITE SYSTEM IN AMERICA
This newfound skepticism of jettisoning long-established legal
principles provides courts with an opportunity to reexamine the intel-
lectual and judicial foundations of the tripartite system as it came to
be known in America. It is possible that the hasty departure from
these rules was ill-advised, if only because their practical outcomes
were desirable policy regardless of the origins of the system. There
are, of course, serious arguments that the traditional law of premises
liability leads to undesirable results. 68 However, it is still worthwhile to
look back into the early cases in America to see the original justifica-
tions for the tripartite system in order to understand how that system
operated and what it can teach us about premises liability law today.
A. The Oigin of the Tripartite System in America
The tripartite system first made its appearance in American
courts in the Massachusetts case of Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport Rail-
road Co.69 in 1865. There, the defendant kept a right-of-way on its
land over which it had allowed the public to pass so long as they did
not interfere with the movement of trains. However, it also kept a
flagman at the crossing to help the public cross safely. On the day of
the accident, the flagman signaled to the plaintiff to stop. After the
plaintiff asked if he might proceed, the flagman signaled that he
could. As he crossed the tracks on his wagon, the plaintiff saw a train
headed toward him. He jumped from the wagon and had his legs
crushed; although it was found at trial that he would not have been
66 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 62, at 433.
67 Id. § 62, at 434.
68 E.g., WEISSENBERGEP ET AL., supra note 21, § 6.8, at 175 ("The negligence
formula encourages defendants to allocate to accident prevention an amount roughly
equal to the foreseeable accident costs. The traditional status-based rules of premises
liability encourage defendants in some cases to let accidents happen when they could
have been prevented at a cost less than the foreseeable accident costs.").
69 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865).
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injured had he stayed in the wagon.70 The Supreme Judicial Court
upheld the lower court's verdict for 
the plaintiff.7 1
In announcing its decision, the court first declared 
the underly-
ing premise of duty in tort law: "All the cases 
in the books. . . turn on
the principle that negligence consists in doing 
or omitting to do an
act by which a legal duty or obligation has been 
violated. 72 Thus, the
court continued, a landowner has no duty in 
law to a trespasser be-
cause "It]he owner of the land is not bound to protect 
or provide
safeguards for wrongdoers.
' 73 Tort law assumes that landowners have
the right to use their land as they see fit, which 
advances the policy
interests of free labor and industriousness. Free 
use of one's land, in
turn, benefits society as a whole by making the 
land and its fruits more
valuable.74 The tort rule against allowing trespassers 
to recover pro-
tects this important right of landowners by 
ensuring that wrongdoers
cannot force landowners to structure their 
use around a potential
physical invasion. Licensees, "who come there 
solely for their own
convenience or pleasure and who are not either 
expressly invited to
enter or induced to come upon them by the 
purpose for which the
premises are appropriated and occupied" must 
take the license and
all its "concomitant perils."
75 Though the court does not expressly
use the word "invitee," it describes another class 
of entrants as those
who have come on the land because the owner 
"has held out [an]
invitation, allurement or inducement, either 
express or implied, by
which they have been led to enter thereon."
7 6 To these entrants, the
owner must keep his premises in a safe and suitable 
condition because
he has expressly invited them, as a member 
of the public, onto the
land and "he thereby assumes an obligation 
that they are in a safe
condition, suitable for such use."
' 77 Since the landowner has chosen
to use his land in such a way as to invite others 
onto it, he thereby
assumes a reasonable duty for their safety, as 
opposed to when a tres-
passer wrongfully comes upon land not open 
to the public. Thus, the
court classified the plaintiff as an invitee because 
the defendant had
taken certain steps that demonstrated to the 
public that the right of
70 Id. at 369-70.
71 Id. at 372.
72 Id. This also seems to undermine 
Professor Green's argument that reduced
landowner liability only gained a foothold 
in the law prior to the acceptance of negli-
gence principles. See Green, supra note 
44, at 511.
73 Sweeny, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 372.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 89-92, 96-98.
75 Sweeny, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 372-73.
76 Id. at 373.
77 Id. at 374.
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way was open and for their use, including laying a plank down to ease
transport over the tracks and maintaining a flagman at the crossing.78
B. Property in an American Republic
The tripartite system of property law is consistent with the way the
Founders viewed property. To these early republicans, property was a
mixture of natural right, to which each individual was entitled regard-
less of government, and positive law, which secured to each person
the right to acquire, possess, and use property of different kinds. 79
The concepts of "no duty" to a trespasser and lower duty to invitees
put into effect a version of that theory of property by ensuring that
landowners were not required to compensate plaintiffs to whom they
owed no duty. At the same time, the Founders believed that a system
of private property with civil laws preventing interference by others
increased the industriousness of the country and promoted the long-
term good of everyone in society.80
American notions of property law had roots in the thought of
William Blackstone who believed that "it]he third absolute right, in-
herent in every Englishman, is that of property."81 The right, inher-
ing in each person, was inviolable: "In vain may it be urged, that the
good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community ....
[T]he public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in
the protection of every individual's private rights, as modeled by the
municipal law." 82 Two points can be made about Blackstone's notion
of an absolute individual right to property. First, it comports well with
the notion of the tripartite system as protecting individual rights. The
Ohio Supreme Court made this point, arguing:
In such cases the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas is in no
sense infringed. In its just legal sense it means "so use your own
property as not to injure the rights of another." Where no right has
been invaded, although one may have injured another, no liability
has been incurred. Any other rules would be manifestly wrong.83
Since individuals have rights in their property, they are only liable
if they have injured the rights of another. The tripartite system as-
signed the rights of individuals based on their status as entrants upon
78 Id. at 375-77.
79 See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
81 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I CoMMENTAREs *138.
82 Id. at *139.
83 Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, & Chi. Ry. Co. v. Bingham, 29 Ohio St. 364, 369
(1876).
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the land. Trespassers, being wrongdoers (even if innocently), are not
entitled to any protection; whereas invitees and licensees gain some
right to be on the land by virtue of consent. Second, Blackstone is
somewhat confusing because he characterizes the right as "absolute."
While it is true that he believes there is an absolute right prior to
government to property, this right is qualified and protected by the
positive law. Thus, citizens are entitled "to the regular administration
and free course of justice in the courts of law" and to petition "the
king and parliament for redress of grievances" whenever their rights
are violated. 84
The notion of property as a natural right was largely accepted by
the founding generation that produced the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Constitution. James Madison-the "Father of the Con-
stitution" and author of the Bill of Rights-wrote that the notion of
property "embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and
have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage."8 5 For
Madison, the concept of property was meant in both a narrow and
broad sense; it encompassed not only physical objects but also one's
own beliefs and opinions. "In a word, as a man is said to have a right
to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his
rights. '8 6 The protection of property as a natural right, in this case
meaning real property, depended upon the positive law.
This interrelation between property as a natural right and as a
positive right was integral to identifying just what characteristics de-
fined "property." James Wilson wrote that property exists in three dif-
ferent degrees: "The lowest degree of this right is a right merely to
possess a thing. The next degree of this right is a right to possess and
to use a thing. The next and highest degree of this right is a right to
possess, to use, and to dispose of a thing."8 7 In Wilson's mind, positive
law succeeded to the extent that it secured to each person the ability
to possess, use, and dispose of a "thing." Since one of the functions of
government is to secure to each person these rights, "civil society is
obligated to secure not only the right to own property, but all of the
84 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *144. For more on the confusion associated
with Blackstone's treatment of property rights, see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of
the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367, 370 (1991) (noting the confusion
"between the natural and positive law aspects of property").
85 JAMEs MADISON, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OFJAMEs MADISON 101, 101 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1906).
86 Id.
87 2 JAMES WILSON, The History of Property, in THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 483, 483
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896).
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legitimate attributes commonly associated with ownership," 8 such as
the ones Wilson describes.
This protection afforded to private property is not based on an
abstract appeal with no concept of consequences or practical out-
comes, however. Instead, the Founders recognized that securing pri-
vate property would benefit individuals and society. Both Jefferson
and Madison in particular, "put the protection of common law prop-
erty claims in positive terms-that is, in light of the good they fos-
tered: industriousness and the development of human faculties."' 9
Men are more likely to work the land and make it productive if their
possession and use is secure against others.90 Further, as Madison's
essay on property demonstrates, when people are secure in their opin-
ions they will inevitably refine and enlarge them through "free com-
munication" with others.91 More specifically, the goods which result
from private property "include self-preservation, the preservation of
one's family, and the wealth needed to practice other virtues that re-
quire some minimum of material support."92
C. The Link Between Natural Property Rights and the Tripartite System
Introducing a system of property laws consonant with republican
principles of natural justice was not an automatic occurrence. Certain
aspects of the British common law reflected commitments to the feu-
dal past at odds with the free possession, use, and transfer rights which
defined the concept of property in a thing. The task of the founding
generation in the years after the ratification of the Constitution was to
form "a system by which every fibre would be eradicated of antient or
future aristocracy; and a foundation laid for a government truly re-
publican."9 Devices such as primogeniture put unreasonable restric-
tions upon the right of use and transfer and thus reflected "feudal and
88 Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REv. 1549, 1568 (2003).
89 Kmiec, supra note 84, at 383.
90 See WILsON, supra note 87, at 495 ("By exclusive property, the productions of
the earth and the means of subsistence are secured and preserved, as well as
multiplied.").
91 MAzisoN, supra note 85, at 101.
92 Claeys, supra note 88, at 1568.
93 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1,
68 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1982). Incidentally, this
also demonstrates that the foundations of nineteenth-century property law lay in an
attempt to bring old institutions in accordance with republican principles. This is a
further argument why later developments in the law of premises liability were not
mere relics of a feudal past, but consistent with American principles. See supra note
43 and accompanying text.
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unnatural distinctions" 94 that should be expunged from the positive
law.
The theoretical justification for a positive law regime of individ-
ual property rights came mainly from John Locke. A substantial por-
tion of Locke's Second Treatise of Government is devoted to property, its
definition, and the goods which it secures. Since each person has "a
right to their preservation," each must somehow obtain the necessities
of life from the natural world if he is to survive and be concerned with
other goods beyond those basic necessities. Thus, "[w] hatsoever then
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property."95 Individual human labor not
only allowed men to provide for their own needs, but also greatly in-
creased the value of nature to others, for
he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen,
but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serv-
ing to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed
and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times
more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal
richness lying waste in common. 96
If men are secured in their property they are able to increase the
common stock of mankind through labor on a smaller parcel of land
than if that land were in common, lying ungoverned and unappropri-
ated. The excess produced by such labor is not only good for the
mere "support" of men, but also for the "comfort of their being" and
their mutual "convenience." 97
Far from bearing the marks of the feudal past, Locke's thought
was deeply republican and consonant with principles of individual
rights and self-government. Individual control over land is superior to
large tracts controlled by powerful lords, which are not cultivated but
kept for their own pleasure in a state of nature. "IN]umbers of men
are to be preferred to largeness of dominions" since this would lead to
productive labor for the greater good.98 Indeed, "the great art of gov-
ernment" is "by established laws of liberty to secure protection and
encouragement to the honest industry of mankind."9 9 Locke thus rec-
94 JEFFERSON, supra note 93, at 69.
95 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 19 (C. B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
96 Id. § 37, at 23. Locke later says that "ninety-nine hundredths" of the value of a
thing is owed to labor; with the rest remaining to nature. Id. § 40, at 25.
97 Id. § 26, at 18.
98 Id. § 42, at 26.
99 Id.
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ognized, even prior to Blackstone, the dual nature 
of property rights.
Whereas the law of nature, prior to all government, 
"makes the deer
that Indian's who hath killed it" because it is the 
"common right of
every one,"100 positive laws are still necessary to 
more fully secure
those rights. While those living in the state of nature 
still have equal
rights, those "who have made and multiplied positive 
laws to deter-
mine property, this original law of nature" are counted 
among the "civi-
lized part of mankind."
10
' This superiority is not derived from any
inherent superiority of one race to another; 
rather, the advantage is
derived from positive laws of government which 
are more fully able to
enforce the right that each individual has by 
nature.
Viewed in the context of the natural right theory 
of the Found-
ing, the tripartite system is designed to secure 
to each landowner the
use and enjoyment of his own property while at the same time 
impos-
ing specific duties that arise out of his relationship 
with the rest of
society. The laws of civil society cannot give to 
every man a license to
act irresponsibly towards others and thus no one 
may willfully or wan-
tonly injure another even if that other is a trespasser.
10 2 Aside from
that basic condition of good living in society, 
a landowner enjoys lib-
erty to dispose of his land as he may wish-not only 
for his own good,
but also for the long-term good and productivity 
of society. The posi-
tive law, as Locke argued, must "encourage" 
men to use their land
productively.103 This is done, according to James 
Wilson, by securing
the highest rights that one can have in property: 
possession, use, and
disposition of a "thing."'
0 4 Men must be able to count on the law to
vindicate their right in their property. Without 
such assurances, indi-
viduals will be discouraged from actively engaging 
in developing their
property (in this case, land) since the acts of another 
could deprive
them of such labor permanently. This is the 
situation that exists in a
pure state of nature with little or no government 
and explains why
land, without a system of good laws, is often used 
inefficiently or not at
all.
The special status given to landowners as opposed 
to individuals
in a normal action for a tort arises not from the 
feudal past, but rather
a republican vision of property rights that 
respects individual labor
100 Id. § 30, at 20.
101 Id.
102 Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, 
[1929] A.C. 358, 365
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (opinion of Hailsham, 
L.C.) (indicating that the
landowner is only liable if there is "some act 
done with the deliberate intention of
doing harm to the trespasser").
103 See supra text accompanying note 99.
104 See WILSON, supra note 87, at 483.
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and industriousness. The tripartite system, then, attempts to recon-
cile the need to provide encouragement to individuals in a free society
with the need to provide for the protection of everyone's equal rights.
When one actively induces the public to come upon his lands, thus
making entrants invitees, he is essentially guaranteeing that his land is
as safe as would be required if the land was common to society. A
standard closely analogous to reasonable care applies. To one with a
more limited license, a licensee, the landowner essentially establishes
that his land is still "private" in nature and thus a full duty of care does
not apply. Instead, he must only warn of hidden dangers in order to
make the licensee understand the state of the property and risks he is
taking by entering. The trespasser, however, is perhaps the most vital
category. A landowner cannot have a duty to someone who has no
right. To say otherwise would be to give wrongdoers a veto over the
use of land by the owner and thus harm his right to own, possess, and
use real property.10 5
III. TRESPASS AND THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE EXCEPTION
A. The Common Law Roots of Trespass
The tripartite system, though brought to America in the mid-
nineteenth century, was largely consistent with the founding notion of
private property rights. This is most evident with respect to "trespass-
ers." Blackstone defined trespass as "no more than an entry on an-
other man's ground without a lawful authority, and doing some
damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property."'01 6 The law
views trespass as a harm because of the high regard for the private
holdings of individuals, "[f] or every man's land is in the eye of the law
inclosed and set apart from his neighbours.... And every such entry
or breach of a man's close carries necessarily along with it some dam-
age or other ... ,"i7 Thus, if a trespasser has no right to go upon
another's land, the owner has no duty to provide for his safety except
to restrain from injuring him willfully or wantonly, just as he would
owe this duty to any other person regardless of circumstances. The
early cases and treatises did focus on the actual wrong of the tres-
passer, whereas later in the nineteenth century as the concept of tort
law and duty evolved, the concept shifted into the duties of a land-
105 See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 10 (8th ed. 2004)
("[Trespass] is designed to protect the [landowner's] interest in the exclusive posses-
sion of land and its improvements.").
106 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *209.
107 Id. at *209-10.
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owner. The imposition of duties, like the legislative devices for subdi-
viding property that Jefferson used, had to be consistent with natural
justice and the natural right to property. No landowner ought to be
held to account for the consequences of another's wrong action and
thus the landowner would have no duty to keep his premises safe for
an unexpected intruder.108
B. The Attractive Nuisance Exception
The notion of no duty to a trespasser, however, was not absolute.
Numerous exceptions filled the law. Indeed, it was the perceived
complexity and number of these exceptions which courts cited as the
reason why the tripartite system was no longer practicable.10 9 Perhaps
the exception which has been most discussed in the literature is that
of "attractive nuisance." The attractive nuisance doctrine, generally
speaking, provides that if a child is "attracted" onto the land by some
condition, then the landowner is responsible for the safety of that
child even if the child would technically be a trespasser if an adult.
The Restatement emphasizes that a landowner owes a duty to a child
if an "artificial condition upon the land" is in a place in which "the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to tres-
pass."' 10 Thus, this definition of the attractive nuisance doctrine-
which the Restatement refers to as Artificial Conditions Highly Dan-
gerous to Trespassing Children" '-emphasizes foreseeability and not
attraction. As the comments explain, "the basis of the rule is merely
the ordinary negligence basis of a duty of reasonable care not to inflict
foreseeable harm on another, and the fact that the child is a tres-
passer is merely one of the facts to be taken into consideration."112
The Restatement's position on attractive nuisance doctrine com-
ports with the way the doctrine developed into the early twentieth cen-
tury, and is indeed consistent with the concept of trespass being a
108 The 1896 case of Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 76 F. 201 (7th Cir. 1896) is
wrong, for example, when it says that "notice" to the defendant landowner is the
reason why the law of trespass exists. Id. at 205. While notice is certainly a significant
practical factor, and knowledge of a trespasser does impose certain duties on the land-
owner with respect to care, the no duty rule is derived first and foremost from the
concept of right. Where there is no right to be upon another's lands, there could also
then be no duty to that other.
109 See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566 (Cal. 1968) (discussing the
"subtleties and confusion which have resulted from application of the common law
principles" as applied to landowners).
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
III Id.
112 Id. § 339 cmt. b.
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problem of "notice" as described in Sheehan v. St. Paul 
& D. Railway
Co.' 13 "The real factor is the extent to which the presence 
of children
is to be anticipated by the defendant."
114 However, the initial justifica-
tion for the doctrine was much different than the 
stated reasons in the
early part of the twentieth century. The doctrine 
seems to have
originated in England in the case of Lynch v. Nurdin.
15 The plaintiff
was a seven-year-old boy who had injured himself while playing 
on the
defendant's wagon which was parked in the street. 
Another boy put
the wagon in motion which caused the plaintiff 
to fall. As a result, the
wagon ran over his leg and broke it. Though 
not a strict premises
liability case, the court drew analogy to Bird v. Holbrook,
16 and argued
for it as "decisive authority against the general 
proposition that mis-
conduct, even wilful [sic] and culpable misconduct, must 
necessarily
exclude the plaintiff who is guilty of it from the 
right to sue." 1 7 Thus,
though the boy would normally be guilty of contributory 
negligence
and the owner would not be liable, the court framed 
the case in such
a way as to show that even negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff did
not guarantee a ruling for the defendant. The 
only question was
whether such a situation existed here. The court 
found one in a nas-
cent form of attractive nuisance: "The answer 
is that, supposing that
fact ascertained by the jury, but to this extent, that he merely 
indulged
the natural instinct of a child in amusing himself 
with the empty cart
and deserted horse, then we think that the defendant 
cannot be per-
mitted to avail himself of that fact."' "I Since the 
boy was only acting as
boys do, he could not be said to have been acting 
negligently.
The doctrine entered American law as early as 
1849 in Connecti-
cut in the case of Birge v. Gardiner.'
19 The defendant had erected a
gate on his property. The plaintiff, a boy of seven 
years, while passing
by, grabbed hold of the gate and shook it causing 
it to fall on top of
him and break his leg. The court immediately 
found that this was not
a case of trespass and put it into the realm of 
negligence law like the
113 Sheehan, 76 F. 201; see supra note 108.
114 Manley 0. Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the 
Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L. REx'.
826, 849 (1923). Commentators in the early part of the 
twentieth century like Hud-
son emphasized a new dimension to the law of 
premises liability. Gone were the ideas
of preexisting rights. Instead, Hudson argued 
that, " [t] he essential nature of the task
as a problem in social engineering, is not to be escaped 
through a technique of logic,
nor through a derivation from eighteenth century 
common law procedure." Id. at
839.
115 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (Q.B. 1841).
116 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P. 1828).
117 Lynch, 113 Eng. Rep. at 1044.
118 Id.
119 19 Conn. 506 (1849).
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English court in Lynch.120 The court found that the jury could decide
whether the child, being "without judgment or discretion," could be
held accountable for his action, or whether the acts instead were
caused by his "childish instinct."''
Attractive nuisance eventually migrated more fully into the law of
premises liability. In Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.,' 2 2 the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that "the distinction is not sharply
drawn between the effect of the plaintiffs trespass, as a bar to his right
to require care, and the plaintiff's contributory negligence, as a bar to
his right to recover."' 23 Indeed, the distinction did not make much
practical difference. Since the trespasser was a child, he "occupies a
position widely different from that of an ordinary trespasser."' 12 4 The
child, another seven-year-old, was sitting on the railroad's turntable,
which was unfenced and unprotected, when another child put it into
motion. The plaintiffs foot was caught and mangled and required
amputation. Looking at the different natures of children and adults,
the court concluded that "what an express invitation would be to an
adult, the temptation of an attractive plaything is to a child of tender
years."'125 Thus, the child was more like an adult invitee than a tres-
passer and the landowner owed to him a duty of reasonable care
which it did not perform.
Two years earlier, the United States Supreme Court addressed a
similar issue in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout.' 26 Henry
Stout was six years old when he and two friends found a turntable on
the defendant's property. 12 7 One of the other boys turned it, the ta-
ble not being locked, and it crushed Henry's foot. The boys had been
warned in the past not to go near it, but this was Henry's first time
playing on the turntable. 28 Again, the child's status as a trespasser
120 Id. at 512 ("We do not decide, whether, in this case, the plaintiff was a tres-
passer, or not.... [T]his is not a case between faultless parties.").
121 Id. at 511-12.
122 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
123 Id. at 212.
124 Id. at 213.
125 Id. at 211.
126 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 660-61 (1873). The fact pattern of this case, like Keffe,
involves children hurt while playing on a railroad's "turntable." Id. at 657-58. For
this reason, they are often referred to as the "Turntable Cases" and the attractive
nuisance doctrine is called the "Turntable Doctrine." See PROSSER AND KEETON, Supra
note 22, § 59, at 400. To see some interesting pictures of turntables through the
years, visit Wendell Huffman, Folsom Railroad Block Turntable, http://www.fedshra.
org/turntable.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
127 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 657.
128 Id. at 658.
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did not matter because of the different capacities between children
and adults. Citing a general principle of law and then applying it to
this case, the Court found that:
It is well settled that the conduct of an infant of tender years is not
to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult....
The care and caution required of a child is according to his matur-
ity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by
the circumstances of that case.129
Thus, the doctrine of attractive nuisance in the mid-to-late nineteenth
century stood for the proposition that children and adults ought to be
treated differently because they had different capacities.
The rejoinder, of course, which is often made, is that even if chil-
dren do not have the capacity to know dangerous conditions, then the
responsibility for their actions falls on their parents who are the legal
and natural guardians of their children.130 In other words, "there is a
powerful resistance to the idea that infants are subject to any special
treatment in the law, for why should they be able to force strangers to
bear the costs of their own necessary infirmities when they have par-
ents and guardians explicitly charged with their care?"'131 On a pure
cost/benefit analysis, Epstein argues that the Restatement's language
is designed to "isolate cases in which the benefits generated to the
child far outweigh the costs to the occupier."'3 2 Because the child is
so young and parents cannot conceivably watch him at all moments,
the cheapest cost-avoider becomes the landowner himself and thus
"the balance of advantage shifts to require greater landowner precau-
tions for infants than for adults."' 3 3 On a more basic level, the natural
right analysis so important to the tripartite system does not apply in
the same way with children. According to the founding theory,
"[t] hree of the characteristics that distinguish man from the other ani-
mals are his reason, his freedom, and his conscience." 1 34 Thus,
129 Id. at 660.
130 See, e.g., Ryan v. Towar, 87 N.W. 644, 649-50 (Mich. 1901) ("Admittedly the
duty of incessant watchfulness and care of one's own premises is limited to young
children.... [But why] should it extend to children upon whose parents both nature
and the law impose the duty of care and watchfulness?"). As Ryan demonstrates, not
all early courts accepted attractive nuisance as an exception to the law of premises
liability.
131 EPSTEIN, supra note 20, § 12.5, at 318.
132 Id.
133 Id.; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 59, at 399 ("While it is true
that his parents or guardians are charged with the duty of looking out for him, it is
obviously neither customary nor practicable for them to follow him around with a
keeper, or to chain him to the bedpost.").
134 Claeys, supra note 88, at 1567.
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"[man enjoys the power to choose his course of action"
135 and has
rights and duties associated with his choices. 
Since young children
have not developed their reason yet and are 
thus unable to make in-
formed choices, the law must treat them 
differently from adults who
are fully competent1
3 6
C. Attractive Nuisance as Legal Fiction in the Twentieth 
Century
After the turn of the century, courts began 
to fashion a different
rationale for the attractive nuisance doctrine. 
Instead of being justi-
fied by the different abilities and capacities 
of the child as compared
to a competent adult:
The basis of the liability was thought to be 
little more than the
foreseseability of harm to the child, and the considerations 
of social
policy which, in other negligence cases, 
operate to bring about a
balancing of the conflicting interests, and 
to curtail to a reasonable
extent the defendant's privilege to act as 
he sees fit without regard
to the effects on others.
13 7
Commentators at the beginning of the century 
looked with skep-
ticism on the doctrine. It was not based on 
any understanding of the
nature of the child, but "[p] erhaps no more palpable 
fiction has ever
been employed in order to impose legal responsibility."
138 Even today
the rule is heavily criticized as a "legal fiction," 
which gives courts the
ability to depart from the "traditional rules" 
of premises liability to
135 Id.
136 A late nineteenth-century treatise writer put 
it like this:
It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make 
the owner of land liable
for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking 
meat, so that his neighbor's
dog, attracted by his natural instincts, might run 
into it and be killed; and
which would exempt him from liability for the 
consequences of leaving ex-
posed and unguarded on his land a dangerous 
machine, so that his neigh-
bor's child, attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle 
with it by instincts
equally strong, might thereby be killed, or maimed 
for life. Such is not the
law.
1 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, THE LAw oF NEGLIGENCE 
305 (San Francisco, Bancroft,
Whitney Co., 1886). Thompson was referring to the 1808 
case of Townsend v. Wathen,
103 Eng. Rep. 579 (K-B. 1808). There, the defendant 
baited traps on his property,
near to the plaintiffs property where he kept 
his dogs, in order to induce them to
come onto the land and be killed in his traps. 
In holding for the plaintiff, the court
asked: "What difference is there in reason between 
drawing the animal into the trap
by means of his instinct which he cannot resist, 
and putting him there by manual
force?" Id. at 581.
137 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22, § 59, at 401.
138 Green, supra note 44, at 508.
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come up with a socially acceptable outcome. 139 The doctrine "rests
upon the fanciful notion that the landowner, by maintaining the in-
strumentality, impliedly invites the child onto his land, and hence
owes him a duty of due care under the circumstances."' 40
This movement away from the distinction between a child and an
adult to the concept of notice placed children back within the normal
system of negligence to which premises liability law was an exception.
Landowners now generally owed a duty of reasonable care to chil-
dren, especially when it was generally foreseeable that they would
come upon the land and injure themselves. Consider how one writer
proposed to apply the doctrine of reasonableness to children coming
onto land:
In applying this legal standard, account must of course be taken of
the use to which the land is being put, as well as of the position of
the visitor on the land of the defendant, and of the extent to which
the defendant knew of the intruder's presence, or anticipated it, or
would have anticipated it if he had acted as an ordinary prudent
man would have acted. These are not all of the factors to be consid-
ered, though they are among the most important.141
This list of factors bears striking resemblance to how the Califor-
nia Supreme Court framed the question of reasonableness when it
abolished all the distinctions in favor of the standard tests of negli-
gence law. When considering whether the landowner should be im-
mune or not, the courts should not simply look to the status of the
entrant but must consider other factors as well, "including the close-
ness of the connection between the injury and the defendant's con-
duct, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy
of preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of in-
surance." 142 Though the factors are not identical, the principle is the
same: move away from the special status given to landowners towards a
general duty of reasonable care.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Trespassers
Elimination, or even major modifications, of the common law cat-
egory of trespass can lead to anomalous results that most would con-
139 WEISSENBERCER Er AL., supra note 21, § 2.9, at 22.
140 Id.
141 Hudson, supra note 114, at 845.
142 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).
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sider unjust. For example, in Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority,'43 the
Illinois Supreme Court "allowed the estate of a drunken, illiterate,
trespasser, who stumbled through five warning signs, barricades, a
trespass prevention system, and then electrocuted himself by urinat-
ing on a 600 volt '3rd rail,' to recover $1.5 million."144
Of course, results such as this may be rare and perhaps do not
counsel against maintaining a separate category for trespassers in
premises liability law. However, most state courts have held onto the
distinctions, resisting the Rowland abolition of all categories. Many of
the courts which jumped on the Rowland bandwagon saw their deci-
sions either reversed by later rulings or overturned by acts of the legis-
lature.145 Further, many courts which joined Rowland in merging the
invitee and licensee categories into one of reasonable care, still main-
tained a separate category for trespassers. The Iowa Supreme Court
noted that "presently six states use a negligence standard to govern
trespasser liability; twenty-nine states have declined the opportunity to
change their rule in such cases; and two state legislatures have rein-
stated the common law trespasser rule after it had been abolished by
court decision."'146
There seems to be a general belief, even today, that the trespasser
distinction was not only useful for feudal society, but also has some-
thing important about it which helps maintain a healthy system of pri-
vate property rights. Today, more than ever, "[1land ownership is not
limited to the privileged few in modern American society; many, many
persons own real property. The private ownership of land continues
to be a treasured opportunity, and the interests of landowners are still
deserving of consideration." 14 7 Preventing trespassers from receiving
compensation when the landowner has not acted to hurt them inten-
tionally is consonant with a respect for private property. If the law is
willing to punish a trespasser for even the most minor of transgres-
sions, 14 why should it hold the landowner accountable when the tres-
passer is injured as a result of that transgression? Thus, "even in
modern society it is significant that a trespasser does not come upon
143 605 N.E.2d 493 (I1l. 1992).
144 Eric Carlson, Case Note, Premises Liability-The Exception that Swallowed the Rule,
19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 217, 217 (1994).
145 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
146 Alexander v. Med. Assocs. Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 2002).
147 Id. at 79.
148 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-162 (Wis.
1997) (reinstating punitive damage award of $100,000 for landowner with only nomi-
nal damages where seller of mobile home intentionally trespassed to deliver mobile
home to adjacent land).
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property under a color of right."' 49 The founding concept of "right"
in property law thus holds much sway even today.
B. Reasonable Care
It is, of course, possible that even if the courts maintain a separate
category for trespassers that they should apply a general standard of
reasonable care to those traditionally classified as either invitees or
licensees. As the Maine Supreme Court noted, "both invitees and
licensees enter another's lands under color of right."1 50 More so than
with trespassers, the question becomes one of general policy consider-
ations and the long-term consequences to the system of premises lia-
bility and negligence law. The concept of "right" is appropriately
deemphasized to a certain extent because in both cases the landowner
has consented, even if to a lesser extent to a licensee. Further, it
seems odd that social guests, who are normally considered licensees,
should receive less protection than members of the general public. 15 1
The system as a whole, of course, still falls under more general
attacks even today. One critique says that "the status approach contin-
ues to breed anomalies."'15 2 It calls attention to the case of Mercer v.
Fritts'5 3 in which the court applied a standard of liability based on ani-
mals, rather than premises liability law, when a plaintiff was injured
riding one of defendant's horses while on the defendant's land.154
Under the former standard, the defendant owed a duty of reasonable
care, while at the time in Kansas, landowners owed no more to social
guests other than refraining from willful or wanton actions . 55 The
anomaly, then, is that the court chose to apply the stricter standard of
negligence rather than the prevailing standard for licensees. This ar-
gument, however, is not persuasive. This is not so much an anomaly
as a choice of law by the Kansas courts. The outcome may have been
different depending upon which standard the court chose but this
149 Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 994 (Wash. 1986); see also Poulin v. Colby
Coll., 402 A.2d 846, 851 n.5 (Me. 1979) ("We are unconvinced that the status of tres-
passer fails to carry continued significance in our modern society.").
150 Poulin, 402 A.2d at 851 n.5.
151 This of course could be remedied by a less drastic measure than abolishing the
system as a whole. Instead, courts or legislatures could move "social guests" into the
invitee category while maintaining the licensee category for others who are on the
premises for their own purposes.
152 WEISSENBERGER ET AL., supra note 21, § 6.8, at 175.
153 689 P.2d 774 (Kan. 1984).
154 Id. at 774-75.
155 Id.
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says nothing about the workability of the common 
law's status
approach.
Every system of liability has problems with cases 
at the margins.
No one system can effectively eliminate all the 
tough choices judges
and juries face. Given this fact, it is wise to look not only 
at the spe-
cific results of a system of liability, but also at 
its effects on the tort
system as a whole. Professor Henderson argues 
that the abolition of
the common law categories is symptomatic of 
a larger problem in the
system of torts, which has forgotten that "[t]he most 
basic limit of
adjudication is that it requires substantive rules of sufficient 
specificity
to support orderly and rational argument on 
the question of liabil-
ity." 156 Under Rowland and its progeny, triers of fact are deprived 
of
many of these substantive rules. Cases like Rowland 
have attempted to
keep the substance of the law, in that they use 
the status of the entrant
as one factor of the decision, but have abandoned 
the form of the
common law, thus epitomizing what Henderson 
has "characterized as
the retreat from the rule of law."
15 7 Essentially, the decision to aban-
don clear legal boundaries results in open-ended 
cases which become
almost unmanageable. The standard of reasonableness 
is too vague to
have any real meaning, making it hard to apply 
to individual cases
because it "utterly fails to distinguish between 
sound and unsound
approaches."
158
Indeed, Professor Epstein's solution for the 
problems he sees
with the tort system as a whole closely parallels 
how the common law
distinctions were initially prepared and applied 
and are pertinent
here. He would set up a system of "presumptive 
liability rules that
govern each class of cases," but also gradually 
introduce "a set of ex-
cuses or justifications, each of which makes the overall system 
a bit
more reasonable than before."
15 9 Establishing clear legal rules would
bring stability, predictability, and consistency 
to the law of torts. This
applies with equal force to the law of premises 
liability whereby land-
owners and entrants would have clearly defined 
duties and rights in
the law. "The common law categories seize on 
the salient features of
recurrent situations to create a series of per 
se rules, which are de-
signed in the end to approximate the ideal of 
reasonable care under
the circumstances."'1 6
0 The Rowland approach attempts to do the
same thing on a case-by-case basis through a unitary 
standard which
156 Henderson, supra note 45, at 468.
157 Id. at 513.
158 Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 
71 U. Ctit. L. RFv. 639,
643 (2004).
159 Id. at 648.
160 EPSTEIN, supra note 20, § 12.11, at 331.
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creates more uncertainty and therefore greater costs to the system.
Thus, if "the common law rules do the same job better, with less un-
certainty and lower administrative costs, then those states that have
opted to retain them have on balance made the sounder decision."' 61
The costs of a system based on "reasonableness," and in this case
the particular system of premises liability, offer a compelling case for
adopting per se rules as Professor Epstein argues. Nevertheless, alter-
native justifications, which are compatible with his analysis, present
themselves from the concept of the natural right to property em-
braced by the Founders. James Wilson, in particular, recognized that
any system of rules had to have certain characteristics to be just: "Law
is called a rule, in order to distinguish it from a sudden, a transient, or
a particular order: uniformity, permanency, stability, characterize a
law."162 One of the chief characteristics of republican government is
knowledge of what duties and rights one has under the law. For our
purposes, this means that the laws defining private property are fixed
and knowable. 163 In this sense, the Rowland reasonableness test fails
to fully secure the goods associated with stable law. Each case is de-
cided on the facts using a number of different factors which may
weigh differently in each case. This "retreat from the rule of law"1 64 as
Henderson characterized it has deleterious effects in the long run on
the entire system of civil liability by eroding the "degree of stability
and predictability"' 65 that the unitary standard forgoes to achieve al-
most total flexibility.
CONCLUSION
Despite the insistence that the tripartite system of premises liabil-
ity was rooted in feudal culture and is therefore no more than a relic
of an ancient past, it still does and should hold sway in many states
today. Regardless of any problems with its origins in an English soci-
ety with land use patterns different from our own in many respects,
the system is acceptable from the standpoint of property rights in the
161 Id.
162 1 WILSON, supra note 87, at 55.
163 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
("It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own
choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promul-
gated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is
today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but
how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?").
164 Henderson, supra note 45, at 513.
165 Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 995 (Wash. 1986).
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Founding and is practical in that it secures the free use and 
possession
of land to its owners while at the same time fairly 
imposing duties that
arise out of the landowner's relation with the 
rest of society. The
modern trend toward reestablishing the category 
of trespassers, and
even the categories of invitees and licensees, 
demonstrates that the
Rowland court perhaps moved too hastily away from 
a workable system
of landowner liability because of its concerns 
about ancient English
political systems. Modern courts will find it useful 
to focus not only
on the duties that landowners owe to those 
who enter upon their
land, but also the right under which the entrance 
occurs. This basic
framework, regardless of its origins, provides a stable 
system of liability
by spelling out reasonable guidelines upon which 
judges and juries
can base their decisions in particular cases, thus 
eliminating many of
the problems associated with open-ended 
balancing. As James
Madison observed, "that alone is a just government, which 
impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own.
''66
166 MADISON, supra note 85, at 102.
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